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Machinery Risk Assessment Under ISO 12100 and ANSI B11.0-2023 Explained

A machinery risk assessment is the documented process of finding a machine's hazards, estimating and evaluating each risk, and deciding how that risk is reduced, and ISO 12100:2010 and ANSI B11.0-2023 are the international and US type-A standards that set out the method. UTEC Industrial designs, engineers, machines, fabricates, and installs custom material handling systems for aerospace and heavy industry from its Spokane Valley, WA facility, integrating Allen-Bradley PLC and motion control with in-house CNC machining, heat treating, and stress relief. This article covers each standard's scope and wording, why no federal rule requires either assessment, B11.0's reach into material handling, how risk is estimated and judged reduced enough, and the hand-off to guards, safety functions, and required performance levels. The assessment starts at the first link of the build chain, design → engineering → parts machining → fabrication → assembly → weld fatigue → stress relief → drives → controls → tuning → monitoring, and the safety functions it names are carried later by the drives, controls, and monitoring.

What do ISO 12100:2010 and ANSI B11.0-2023 each cover?​

ISO describes ISO 12100:2010 as specifying "basic terminology, principles and a methodology for achieving safety in the design of machinery", with principles of risk assessment and risk reduction "to help designers" achieve that objective. Its abstract describes procedures for "identifying hazards and estimating and evaluating risks during relevant phases of the machine life cycle, and for the elimination of hazards or sufficient risk reduction", gives guidance on the documentation and verification of the process, and says the standard is also intended as a basis for type-B or type-C safety standards. It "does not deal with risk and/or damage to domestic animals, property or the environment."

The ISO page shows the 2010 edition at stage 90.92 (to be revised): it was "last reviewed and confirmed in 2022" and is "Expected to be replaced by ISO/DIS 12100.3 within the coming months." The pages for ISO/TR 22100-1:2021 and ISO/TR 22100-2:2013, the two technical reports that explain how ISO 12100 relates to other machinery standards, carry the same replacement notice.

ANSI B11.0-2023 is the US counterpart. Its publisher's page calls it a type-A standard that "specifies basic terminology, principles and a methodology for achieving acceptable risk in the design and the use of machinery", with principles of risk assessment and risk reduction "to help designers, integrators and users of machinery". It describes procedures for identifying hazards and estimating and evaluating risks during relevant phases of the machine lifecycle, "and for the elimination of hazards or the provision of sufficient risk reduction", and points to its clause 6 for risk assessment. The two texts differ in three places a buyer can see: B11.0 says "acceptable risk" where ISO says "safety", it covers "the design and the use" where ISO says "design", and it names integrators and users alongside designers (ISO 12100:2010; ANSI B11.0-2023; ISO/TR 22100-1:2021; ISO/TR 22100-2:2013).

Does a US federal rule require an ISO 12100 or B11.0 risk assessment?​

No federal OSHA rule requires an ISO 12100 or B11.0 risk assessment. OSHA's robotics standards page lists B11.0 among national consensus standards that "are NOT OSHA regulations", adding that "they do provide guidance from their originating organizations related to worker protection." OSHA's incorporation-by-reference list, 29 CFR 1910.6, names ISO documents in paragraph (v), and ISO 12100 is not among them; no ANSI B11 standard appears in it either. OSHA's 2003 letter on ISO/IEC standards, set out in the machine guarding and maintenance access article, says OSHA would enforce ISO/IEC provisions only if it adopted them through notice and comment rulemaking.

A 2005 OSHA letter answers the question a buyer of an imported or ISO-designed machine is likely to ask. Under 1910.212(a)(1), "An employer may choose any method or methods of guarding that will provide the intended protection", including guarding that conforms to European Norms and the European Community machinery directive. "What is determinative under the OSH Act, however, is not whether the guarding meets European standards, but whether the guarding protects employees in the manner contemplated by the machine guarding standard." For point-of-operation guarding under 1910.212(a)(3), the letter says case law establishes that the phrase "appropriate standards" refers to specific OSHA standards published or incorporated by reference in Title 29, and European standards "would not qualify". Where an OSHA standard calls for a specific method of point-of-operation guarding, the employer must comply with it, although OSHA "may treat the use of a different method of guarding as a de minimis violation, if the guarding provides equal or greater protection"; where no OSHA standard applies, any method that fulfills the intent of the standard is acceptable. The letter's closing point is that "the only way for an employer in the United States to be assured that it is in compliance with the OSH Act is to provide machine guarding that conforms to the provisions of relevant OSHA standards." The requester said it performed "risk analyses"; the letter does not require or approve one.

One narrow OSHA interpretation does ask for an analysis. Under OSHA's 2008 letter, a PLC system is presumed ineffective protection. If an employer can demonstrate that it is an alternative measure that provides effective protection, it may be used only for minor tool changes, adjustments, and other minor servicing that meet the 1910.147(a)(2)(ii) Note, and the employer "must demonstrate that there is effective employee protection, through the use of a system hazard analysis, before OSHA would accept PLCs for minor servicing" activities. OSHA states that interpretation letters cannot create additional employer obligations (OSHA Robotics: Standards, 2026; OSHA 29 CFR 1910.6; OSHA Standard Interpretation, May 13, 2003; OSHA Standard Interpretation, February 8, 2005; OSHA Standard Interpretation, January 25, 2008; OSHA 29 CFR 1910.212-1974).

Does ANSI B11.0 apply to material handling machines?​

The B11.0-2023 scope, as its publisher states it, applies to "new, existing, modified or rebuilt power driven machines, not portable by hand while working, that are used to process materials by cutting; forming; pressure; electrical, thermal or optical techniques; lamination; or a combination of these processes." It "includes associated equipment used to transfer material or tooling, including fixtures, to assemble/disassemble, and to inspect or test", and the associated equipment, "including logic controller(s) and associated software or logic together with the machine actuators and sensors", is considered part of the industrial machinery. Informative Note 1 says a machine can be an assembly of linked parts, at least one of which moves, joined for an application "such as, for the processing, treatment, marking, or moving of material." Informative Note 3 says a machine system "includes any associated material handling, manipulating, gauging, measuring, or inspecting equipment", and Note 4 points to ANSI B11.20 for integrating machinery into a system. The page adds: "Other industry sectors may benefit from applying this standard."

As engineering reasoning, a coil car feeding a slitter, a loader serving a forming press, or a roll-transfer table beside a mill stand falls within the "associated equipment used to transfer material" wording. A stand-alone transfer car in a fabrication bay, a positioner holding an airframe section, or a log deck feeding a sawmill is not named by that scope, and using B11.0 there is a choice the specifying engineer makes and should state in the contract. The publisher of ANSI B11.TR3-2000 (reaffirmed 2015), the B11 risk-assessment technical report, says it "defines a method for conducting a risk assessment and risk reduction for machine tools"; as engineering reasoning, applying it to handling machinery is the same kind of choice. Where a machine-specific (type-C) safety standard exists, the B11.0 page says its requirements "shall generally apply", and deviations from it "shall be based on a documented risk assessment". As engineering reasoning, ASME B20.1-2024 is the machine-specific standard a specifier would look to for a conveyor (ANSI B11.0-2023; ANSI B11.TR3-2000, reaffirmed 2015; ASME B20.1-2024).

How do type-A, type-B and type-C standards divide the work?​

ISO/TR 22100-1:2021, a 16-page technical report, "provides assistance to the designer/manufacturer of machinery and related components as to how the system of existing type-A, type-B and type-C machinery safety standards should be applied in order to design a machine to achieve a level of tolerable risk by adequate risk reduction." It explains how ISO 12100, as the type-A standard, is used with type-B and type-C standards for practical cases, and "includes an overview of existing categories of type-B standards". ISO 12100:2010 itself says it is intended as a basis for the preparation of type-B or type-C safety standards.

The B11.0-2023 page sets the US order of precedence in two sentences. "A risk assessment may be required to determine if a machine-specific 'base' (type-C) safety standard adequately covers the hazards associated with the specific application of a machine." And "Where a machine-specific (type-C) safety standard exists, the requirements of the machine-specific 'base' (type-C) safety standard shall generally apply. Deviations from the requirements of this standard or from any machine-specific (type-C) safety standard shall be based on a documented risk assessment."

As engineering reasoning, a heavy-handling project can read the standards in that order:

  • The machine-specific standard first, where one exists: ASME B20.1-2024 for a conveyor, for example. For a robot cell, RIA TR R15.306-2016 is the A3 technical report that "describes one method of risk assessment that would comply with the 2012 R15.06 requirements".
  • Standards for particular safeguards and safety functions next: ISO 13849-1:2023 for safety-related parts of control systems, ISO 14119:2024 for interlocking devices, ISO 13857:2019 for safety distances, and ANSI B11.19-2019 for risk reduction measures.
  • The type-A method last, for every hazard the other documents leave open, and for the record that ties them together.

A transfer car with no machine-specific standard falls almost entirely to the type-A method, and the assessment then carries the whole safety case for that machine (ISO/TR 22100-1:2021; ISO 12100:2010; ANSI B11.0-2023; ASME B20.1-2024; RIA TR R15.306-2016).

What steps does the risk assessment follow?​

ISO 12100:2010 sets the steps out in clause 5: determining the limits of the machinery (its use, space, time, and other limits) in 5.3; identifying hazards in 5.4, with example hazards in Annex B; estimating risk in 5.5; and evaluating risk in 5.6. Risk reduction follows in clause 6, which covers inherently safe design measures (6.2), safeguarding and complementary protective measures (6.3), and information for use (6.4).

Two public descriptions give the same shape. The B11 page for ANSI B11.TR3-2000 (reaffirmed 2015) says its method "requires gathering the appropriate information, determining the limits of the machine, identifying tasks and hazards over the lifecycle of the machine using a task-based approach, estimating risk associated with the task-hazard combinations, reducing risk according to a prioritized procedure, and documenting the results." Rockwell Automation's Machinery Safebook 5 (2016), a controls supplier's guide, draws the process as a loop: machine limits ("Can you foresee all possible operation and use of the machine"), hazard identification, risk estimation, risk evaluation ("Is the level of risk acceptable"), and risk reduction by re-design or additional measures, repeated until the safety measures have been "analyzed and proven adequate".

As engineering reasoning, the limits step is where a heavy-handling assessment goes right or wrong. For a hydraulic coil upender in an aluminum rolling mill, the limits record the coil weight and diameter range the customer will run, every person who can be near the machine (operator, crane signaler, maintenance technician, contractor), every operating mode (automatic, manual, maintenance, recovery after a power loss), and the expected service life. A hazard that falls outside the limits as written is never estimated at all (ISO 12100:2010, 5.3 to 5.6 and clause 6; ANSI B11.TR3-2000, reaffirmed 2015; Rockwell Automation SAFEBK-RM002C-EN-P, p. 22).

Why must the assessment cover maintenance and other non-production tasks?​

The B11.TR3 method identifies "tasks and hazards over the lifecycle of the machine using a task-based approach", and the report "describes the risk assessment and risk reduction responsibilities of both the machine tool supplier and user". Its publisher says it is intended for use on all new or modified machines and equipment designs and processes, and that the user may also use it for existing tasks and hazards.

Rockwell's Safebook 5 explains the cost of leaving a task out. Its risk-assessment section "applies both to machine manufacturers and to machine users"; the assessment "should be started at the machine design phase" and should take account of "all the foreseeable tasks that will need to be performed on the machine", and the guide calls this task-based approach at the early iterations "very important". Its example is a regular need to adjust moving parts: if that task is missed early, measures for it "may be difficult or impossible to implement at later stage", and "the adjustment of moving parts still has to be performed but must be done in a manner that is either unsafe or inefficient (or both)." The same section says that even if a machine has been declared safe by the manufacturer, "the machine user should still perform a risk assessment", and that individual safe machines "may be combined together in a manner that could be unsafe."

As engineering reasoning, the tasks that decide a heavy-handling design are not limited to the production cycle: they include clearing a jammed billet from a roll table, changing a worn wheel on a transfer car, re-reeving a hoist, adjusting a chain take-up, and recovering a load left suspended after a power failure (ANSI B11.TR3-2000, reaffirmed 2015; Rockwell Automation SAFEBK-RM002C-EN-P, p. 23).

How is risk estimated, and do different tools agree?​

ISO 12100:2010 treats risk in 5.5 as a combination of the severity of harm and the probability of occurrence of that harm, the probability being a function of the exposure of persons to the hazard, the occurrence of a hazardous event, and the technical and human possibilities to avoid or limit the harm. ISO/TR 14121-2:2012, a 38-page technical report, "gives practical guidance on conducting risk assessment for machinery in accordance with ISO 12100 and describes various methods and tools for each step in the process"; the methods it describes are expected to include risk matrices, risk graphs, numerical scoring, and hybrid tools.

The tool chosen changes the answer. An IRSST study by Chinniah, Gauthier, Lambert, and Moulet (Report R-684, 2011, peer-reviewed) applied 31 qualitative risk-estimation tools that follow the 2007 risk-assessment standard ISO 14121-1, since withdrawn, to 20 hazardous situations. Its abstract reports:

  • "significant differences among the tools in estimating risks associated with the same hazardous situations, i.e. risk is tool dependent";
  • the scope of a tool and its construction or architecture "seem to be one of the contributing factors in this variability";
  • tools following the two configurations proposed in the 2007 standard produced similar average risk levels, "but both configurations have tools that will underestimate or overestimate risk";
  • "simple tools, which have 2 parameters, can be as effective as more detailed tools, which have 4 parameters";
  • the 31 tools grouped as 9 low, 8 intermediate, and 14 high risk-estimating tools, and "there are tools which are not appropriate for machinery risk assessment even if their scopes often state the opposite."

Safebook 5 gives the matching warning for risk graphs and tables: they "must not be used in isolation or in an overly simplistic manner." As engineering reasoning, a project fixes one tool, writes down how each parameter level is defined, and has the same team score every hazard, which makes the results comparable across the machine (ISO 12100:2010, 5.5; ISO/TR 14121-2:2012; Chinniah et al., IRSST Report R-684, 2011; Rockwell Automation SAFEBK-RM002C-EN-P, p. 33).

When is risk reduced enough: acceptable, tolerable, or sufficient?​

Each document uses its own term, and they are not interchangeable:

  • ISO 12100:2010 speaks of "the elimination of hazards or sufficient risk reduction"; its definitions of hazard, harm, risk, risk assessment, and adequate risk reduction are in clause 3.
  • ANSI B11.0-2023 speaks of "achieving acceptable risk in the design and the use of machinery."
  • ISO/TR 22100-1:2021 speaks of "a level of tolerable risk by adequate risk reduction."
  • ANSI B11.TR3-2000 (reaffirmed 2015), in its publisher's description, says "The risk reduction process is not completed until tolerable risk is achieved", and that the report "explicitly recognizes that zero risk is virtually unattainable."
  • ANSI B11.19-2019 (reaffirmed 2024) says any deviation from its requirements "shall be carefully considered and based on a documented risk assessment to achieve acceptable risk."

None of these documents puts a single number on the threshold in the text quoted here. The decision is a judgment recorded in the assessment.

Safebook 5 names the failure mode at this step. "After the protective measure has been chosen and before it is implemented it is important to repeat the risk estimation", it says, calling this "a procedure that is often missed": an operator who feels fully protected may intervene differently, may "be exposed to the hazard more often", or may "enter further into the machine". As engineering reasoning, a contract for a heavy machine names the standard and its term, and asks for the residual risks left after each measure to be listed (ISO 12100:2010, clause 3; ANSI B11.0-2023; ISO/TR 22100-1:2021; ANSI B11.TR3-2000, reaffirmed 2015; ANSI B11.19-2019, reaffirmed 2024; Rockwell Automation SAFEBK-RM002C-EN-P, p. 33).

What is the three-step method, and where do guards and safety functions fit?​

ISO 12100:2010 sets out the risk-reduction strategy in clause 4 and its Figure 1 as three steps in order: inherently safe design measures, then safeguarding and complementary protective measures, then information for use. Chinniah and co-authors, in a 2019 peer-reviewed review in Safety, describe the same hierarchy of protective measures "stated by the ISO 12100:2010 standard". Inherently safe design is at the top. The second layer, "Safeguarding and complementary protective measures", includes physical means to enforce safe distance or prevent access to hazards, and active controls like interlocks and safeguarding devices. The third, "Information for use", covers warnings, labels, the human-machine interface, and manuals. A further layer, "Protective measures implemented by the user", is primarily the workplace's responsibility and covers administrative controls such as safe working procedures (for example, hazardous energy control procedures), worker authorization and permitting, training and supervision, and PPE.

The same review ties the guard choice to access frequency: where frequent access is needed, "for e.g., more than once or twice a week, fixed guards can be inconvenient but straightforward", and "Interlocking guards and presence-sensing safeguarding devices are two of the risk reduction methods that can be used when access rates of more than once per shift is needed." It adds that interlocking guards and safety devices "rely heavily on safe control systems to fulfil their safety functions".

The B11 page for ANSI B11.19-2019 (reaffirmed 2024) lists the measures it gives performance requirements for: inherently safe by design (clause 7), guards (clause 8), control functions (clause 9), devices (clause 10), and administrative controls (clause 11). It "does not provide the requirements for the selection of the risk reduction measure for a particular application"; the selection comes from the risk assessment. The IFA's 2023 summary of ISO 13849-1 places that standard at "stage 2 of the risk reduction process, i.e. as risk reduction through technical protective measures" (ISO 12100:2010, clause 4 and Figure 1; Chinniah et al., 2019, §1; ANSI B11.19-2019, reaffirmed 2024; Hauke et al., 2023, §4).

How does the risk assessment set required performance levels and SIL?​

Pilz, a safety-controls supplier, puts the hand-off in one sentence: "The safety integrity requirements (PL, SIL) are derived from the risk estimation", with the required safety level determined "via graphs, which illustrate the severity of injury and the frequency or duration of exposure." The standards themselves leave the choice to the assessment. ISO says ISO 13849-1:2023 "does not specify the safety functions or required performance levels (PLr) that are to be used in particular applications", and it applies only to safety-related parts of control systems "for high demand and continuous modes of operation".

The IFA's 2023 summary of the fourth edition describes the route. The informative Annex A "can be used in this context to determine the required performance level (PLr) unless it is specified in a product standard (type-C standard)", and each safety function is defined in a safety requirements specification whose basis is "the risk assessment and reduction process as per EN ISO 12100". In Annex A, the probability of occurrence of a hazard event is "generally estimated as being high (100%)"; where a low estimate is possible, the PLr from the risk graph "can be downgraded by one level", and "this decision must be justified and documented."

ISO/TR 22100-2:2013 is the 6-page report that "describes the general relationship between ISO 12100 and ISO 13849-1", focusing "on the use of safety-related parts of control systems in relation to risk assessment and the risk reduction process"; it explains how the hazards and risk estimates from the ISO 12100 assessment carry into each safety function and its PLr. IEC 62061:2021+AMD1:2024+AMD2:2026 is the alternative route for safety-related control systems on machines, with its main body written for systems "intended to be used in high/continuous demand mode" (Pilz, 2026; ISO 13849-1:2023; Hauke et al., 2023, §5 and §11; ISO/TR 22100-2:2013; IEC 62061:2021+AMD1:2024+AMD2:2026).

What controls and sensing data does a risk assessment depend on?​

The intelligence layer supplies facts the assessment needs and carries the measures it selects. The IFA summary lists what the 2023 edition of ISO 13849-1 expects a safety requirements specification to record for each safety function, including:

  • the triggering event and the required reaction to reach the safe state;
  • the PLr and the permitted response time;
  • the operating modes in which the function must be active;
  • behavior on energy loss, with examples such as "non-return valves directly on a cylinder or additional mechanical brakes";
  • the demand rate, the priority between functions, and the conditions permitting a restart.

A note in the ISO 14119:2024 abstract says "The processing of the signal from the interlocking device to stop the machine and prevent unexpected start up is covered in ISO 14118, ISO 13849-1 and IEC 62061." Energy isolation stays separate: OSHA's lockout/tagout directive says "Push-buttons, selector switches, safety interlocks and other control circuit type devices are NOT energy isolating devices", and OSHA's 2019 request for information notes that control circuit type devices "are specifically excluded from OSHA's definition of an EID". The stored-energy article covers what that means for hydraulic and gravity loads.

As engineering reasoning, on a heavy machine the numbers in the assessment come from the controls: the stopping time and distance of a loaded transfer car from drive and encoder data, the speed a positioner can reach in manual mode, the time a hydraulic axis takes to drift with a valve failed open. Monitoring closes the loop, since logged guard openings, interlock faults, and mode changes show which tasks happen at a higher rate than the assessment assumed. UTEC Industrial, a Rockwell Automation Recognized System Integrator, builds UL 508A control panels and integrates Allen-Bradley ControlLogix and CompactLogix control with VFD and servo drives into the handling systems it builds (Hauke et al., 2023, §5; ISO 14119:2024; OSHA Instruction CPL 02-00-147, p. 1-6; OSHA, Federal Register 84 FR 22756, 2019).

Where does the risk assessment sit in the build chain, and what should the buyer ask for?​

As engineering reasoning, each link of the chain answers part of the assessment:

  • Design and engineering set the limits, list the tasks and hazards, and choose between inherently safe design, guards, and safety functions.
  • Parts machining, fabrication, and assembly produce the guards, mechanical stops, load-holding hardware, and mounts the assessment calls for.
  • Weld fatigue and stress relief decide whether a frame, arm, or lifting beam can fail under repeated load, which is a hazard in its own right on heavy equipment.
  • Drives, controls, and tuning deliver the stopping performance, speed limits, and restart behavior the safety functions specify.
  • Monitoring records how the machine is actually used, which is the input for re-running the assessment after a change.

On documentation, Safebook 5 says: "The whole process should be documented. Not only will this ensure a more thorough job, but it will also make the results available for checking by other parties." The B11.0-2023 page says "Guidance is given regarding the documentation and verification of the risk assessment and risk reduction process." ISO 12100:2010 sets out in clause 7 what the documentation of the risk assessment and risk reduction is to record, and B11.0-2023 expects the risk-reduction measures to be confirmed as implemented and effective before the machine is used.

As engineering practice, a buyer can ask for the task and hazard list, the estimation tool and its parameter definitions, the measure chosen for each hazard, the residual risks and information for use, the safety requirements specification for each safety function, and the verification record. UTEC Industrial performs factory acceptance testing and on-site commissioning, where the safety functions named in the assessment can be tested against that record (Rockwell Automation SAFEBK-RM002C-EN-P, p. 23; ISO 12100:2010, clause 7; ANSI B11.0-2023).

Related Articles

References​

  • ISO 12100:2010: Safety of machinery — General principles for design — Risk assessment and risk reduction. ISO, 2010.
  • ANSI B11.0-2023: Safety of Machinery. B11 Standards, Inc., 2023.
  • ISO/TR 22100-1:2021: Safety of machinery — Relationship with ISO 12100 — Part 1: How ISO 12100 relates to type-B and type-C standards. ISO, 2021.
  • ISO/TR 22100-2:2013: Safety of machinery — Relationship with ISO 12100 — Part 2: How ISO 12100 relates to ISO 13849-1. ISO, 2013.
  • ISO/TR 14121-2:2012: Safety of machinery — Risk assessment — Part 2: Practical guidance and examples of methods. ISO, 2012.
  • ANSI B11.TR3-2000 (R2015): Risk Assessment and Risk Reduction – A Guide to Estimate, Evaluate and Reduce Risks Associated with Machine Tools. B11 Standards, Inc., 2000 (reaffirmed 2015).
  • ANSI B11.19-2019 (R2024): Performance Requirements for Risk Reduction Measures: Safeguarding and other Means of Reducing Risk. B11 Standards, Inc., 2019 (reaffirmed 2024).
  • ASME B20.1-2024: Safety Standard for Conveyors and Related Equipment. ASME, 2024.
  • RIA TR R15.306-2016: Task-Based Risk Assessment Methodology. Robotic Industries Association/A3, 2016.
  • ISO 13849-1:2023: Safety of machinery — Safety-related parts of control systems — Part 1: General principles for design. International Organization for Standardization, 2023.
  • IEC 62061:2021+AMD1:2024+AMD2:2026: Safety of machinery — Functional safety of safety-related control systems. IEC, 2026 (Ed. 2.2, consolidated version).
  • ISO 14119:2024: Safety of machinery — Interlocking devices associated with guards — Principles for design and selection. International Organization for Standardization, 2024.
  • ISO 13857:2019: Safety of machinery — Safety distances to prevent hazard zones being reached by upper and lower limbs. International Organization for Standardization, 2019.
  • OSHA. Robotics: Standards (Safety and Health Topics). U.S. Department of Labor (undated web documentation, accessed September 2026).
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  • OSHA Standard Interpretation: Use of the European Norms and European Community machinery directive to comply with the 1910.212 "General [guarding] requirements for all machines." Occupational Safety and Health Administration, 2005.
  • OSHA Standard Interpretation: Use of a PLC system as an alternative measure which provides effective protection for minor servicing activities. Occupational Safety and Health Administration, 2008.
  • OSHA 29 CFR 1910.212-1974: General Requirements for All Machines. U.S. Department of Labor, 1974.
  • OSHA 29 CFR 1910.6: Incorporation by Reference. U.S. Department of Labor, as amended through 2026.
  • OSHA Instruction CPL 02-00-147: The Control of Hazardous Energy – Enforcement Policy and Inspection Procedures. Occupational Safety and Health Administration, 2008.
  • OSHA. "The Control of Hazardous Energy (Lockout/Tagout); Request for Information." Federal Register, 84(97), 22756–22762, May 20, 2019.
  • Chinniah, Y., Gauthier, F., Lambert, S., Moulet, F. Experimental Analysis of Tools Used for Estimating Risk Associated with Industrial Machines, Report R-684. IRSST, 2011.
  • Chinniah, Y., Nix, D. S. G., Jocelyn, S., Burlet-Vienney, D., Bourbonnière, R., Karimi, B., Ben Mosbah, A. (2019). "Safety of Machinery: Significant Differences in Two Widely Used International Standards for the Design of Safety-Related Control Systems." Safety, 5(4), 76.
  • Hauke, M., Bömer, T., Büllesbach, K.-H. Fourth edition of EN ISO 13849-1: Most important new features in 2023 at a glance. German Social Accident Insurance (DGUV), 2023.
  • Pilz. Functional safety standards. Pilz, 2026 (undated web documentation, accessed October 2026).
  • Rockwell Automation SAFEBK-RM002C-EN-P: Machinery Safebook 5: Safety related control systems for machinery — Principles, standards and implementation. Rockwell Automation, 2016.

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