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ISO 13849-1:2023 vs. IEC 62061: Performance Levels and SIL Compared

ISO 13849-1:2023 and IEC 62061 Ed. 2.2 are the two machinery standards for designing the control-system parts that perform safety functions, and they rate a safety function in different terms: ISO 13849-1 by performance level (PL), IEC 62061 by safety integrity level (SIL). UTEC Industrial designs, engineers, machines, fabricates, and installs custom material handling systems for aerospace and heavy industry from its Spokane Valley, WA facility, integrating Allen-Bradley PLC and motion control with in-house CNC machining, heat treating, and stress relief. This article compares their scopes, how each sets the required level, why a PL and a SIL correspond but do not convert, how subsystems cross between them, and how OSHA treats these ratings. The comparison sits at the controls link of the build chain, design → engineering → parts machining → fabrication → assembly → weld fatigue → stress relief → drives → controls → tuning → monitoring, where the safety functions named by the design-stage risk assessment are built, tuned, validated, and monitored.

What do ISO 13849-1:2023 and IEC 62061 Ed. 2.2 each cover?​

ISO 13849-1:2023 is Edition 4, published in April 2023 (152 pages), and replaces the 2015 edition. ISO's abstract says it "specifies a methodology and provides related requirements, recommendations and guidance for the design and integration of safety‐related parts of control systems (SRP/CS) that perform safety functions, including the design of software." Its conditions matter:

  • it "applies to SRP/CS for high demand and continuous modes of operation including their subsystems, regardless of the type of technology and energy (e.g. electrical, hydraulic, pneumatic, and mechanical)";
  • it "does not apply to low demand mode of operation";
  • it "does not specify the safety functions or required performance levels (PLr) that are to be used in particular applications";
  • it "does not give specific requirements for the design of products/components that are parts of SRP/CS";
  • it "does not provide specific measures for security aspects", pointing to ISO/TR 22100-4 and IEC/TR 63074.

IEC 62061's current version is the consolidated Edition 2.2, IEC 62061:2021+AMD1:2024+AMD2:2026, published on 20 March 2026 (290 pages). IEC's abstract says it "specifies requirements and makes recommendations for the design, integration and validation of safety-related control systems (SCS) for machines", applies to control systems carrying out safety functions "on machines that are not portable by hand while working, including a group of machines working together in a coordinated manner", and "is a machinery sector specific standard within the framework of IEC 61508 (all parts)." It also states that "The design of complex programmable electronic subsystems or subsystem elements is not within the scope", that the main body is written for high/continuous demand mode, and that the standard does not cover electrical hazards from the control equipment itself, "other safety requirements necessary at the machine level such as safeguarding", or security measures.

CAPIEL, a European controlgear manufacturers' body, sums up the pair in its 2024 white paper: the new editions "have similar scopes and content, and they both aim to achieve the same risk reduction. However, they use different methodologies for the design of safety related control systems" (ISO 13849-1:2023; IEC 62061:2021+AMD1:2024+AMD2:2026; CAPIEL, 2024, §1).

What is a performance level, and what is a SIL?​

OSHA's 2019 request for information on lockout/tagout gives OSHA's description of the difference: "The IEC standards evaluate whether a system can achieve a certain 'safety integrity level,' while the ISO 13849-1 consensus standard evaluates 'performance levels' for each safety function." It adds that, "to determine the level of safety of a control system, both the IEC and the ISO standards consider the reliability of the system as a whole and its components, the operating environment, and the effects of failure." The editions OSHA listed in its footnote were ISO 13849-1:2015 and IEC 62061:2005 with its 2012 and 2015 amendments, both since superseded.

On the scales themselves, Rockwell Automation's Machinery Safebook 5, a 2016 controls-supplier guide written to the earlier editions, says: "There are five performance levels, PLa is the lowest and PLe is the highest", and "There are three SILs used in the machinery sector, SIL 1 is the lowest and SIL 3 is the highest", while IEC 61508 and the process-sector standard IEC 61511 "include SIL 4." Chinniah and co-authors, in a 2019 peer-reviewed review in Safety, explain that IEC 61508-1 (2010) defines its four SILs in two ways, by average probability of dangerous failure on demand for low-demand systems and by average frequency of dangerous failure per hour for high-demand or continuous operation, and that IEC 62061:2005 was "limited to SIL 1 to SIL 3 due to the practical limitations of achieving very high reliability in high-demand applications."

The 2023 edition of ISO 13849-1 aligned one term. The IFA, the research institute of the German Social Accident Insurance, reports that the former "probability of dangerous failure per hour" is now "average frequency of a dangerous failure per hour", abbreviated PFH without the "D" index, "to ensure that it has the same name as in the IEC standards on functional safety. This does not result in technical changes." The IFA also notes that high demand or continuous mode means a demand "more frequent than once a year" under definition 3.1.44, and that for low demand the standard refers to the IEC 61508 series (OSHA, Federal Register 84 FR 22756, 2019, pp. 22758–22759; Rockwell Automation SAFEBK-RM002C-EN-P, pp. 64–65; Chinniah et al., 2019, §2; Hauke et al., 2023, §2 and §3).

How does each standard set the required level from the risk assessment?​

ISO 13849-1:2023 does not specify the safety functions or their PLr, and CAPIEL says IEC 62061's revised structure "reflects the ISO 12100 process more accurately when designing a safety function"; both take their input from the risk assessment. On the ISO side, the IFA says the informative Annex A "can be used in this context to determine the required performance level (PLr) unless it is specified in a product standard (type-C standard)." ISO 13849-1:2023 Annex A determines the PLr with a risk graph on three parameters, severity of injury (S1 or S2), frequency and/or duration of exposure (F1 or F2), and possibility of avoiding the hazard or limiting harm (P1 or P2), with outcomes from PL a to PL e.

The IFA lists two changes to Annex A in the fourth edition:

  • Probability of occurrence. It is no longer merged with parameter P, is "generally estimated as being high (100%)", and where a low estimate is possible the PLr from the risk graph "can be downgraded by one level"; "this decision must be justified and documented." The edition no longer says how to determine that probability.
  • Parameter P. It is now assessed on five factors. Three, if unfavorable, each alone justify P2: the speed at which the hazardous situation arises, the physical space to avoid the hazard, and the perceptibility of the hazard. The other two, whether the machine is used by skilled persons and the complexity of its operation, justify P2 only in combination with other unfavorable factors.

On the IEC side, IEC 62061 Annex A assigns a SIL from the severity of harm (Se) and a class formed from frequency and duration of exposure (Fr), probability of occurrence of a hazardous event (Pr), and possibility of avoiding or limiting harm (Av), in Table A.6. CAPIEL writes that "The table A.6 in EN IEC 62061 for the determination of SIL, now also shows the corresponding PL's", and that "Both standards use the parameters Severity, Frequency, Possibility of Occurrence and Possibility of Avoidance to determine SIL and PLr respectively." Pilz, a safety-controls supplier, lists a "Changed methodology for defining the required safety level (PL or SIL)" among the revisions affecting both standards (Hauke et al., 2023, §1 and §11; ISO 13849-1:2023, Annex A; IEC 62061:2021+AMD1:2024+AMD2:2026, Annex A and Table A.6; CAPIEL, 2024, §3.4; Pilz, 2026).

Do the two methods give the same answer for the same hazard?​

Not necessarily. Chinniah and co-authors compared the 2015 edition of ISO 13849-1 with the 2005 edition of IEC 62061, both now superseded, and concluded that "Subjectivity in the specification and design of safety systems, based on the differences, can lead to different levels of reliability in the safety systems even when considering the same hazard zone of machinery based on which standard is used." In their worked scenarios, "Depending on the standard used, one can obtain two different safety requirements for a same scenario defining a hazardous situation."

They traced part of the gap to the risk graphs. Quoting earlier work by Chinniah and colleagues, they called the 2015 ISO risk graph "overly sensitive to a single incremental change" of the severity parameter, except in the F1-P1 case for a low probability of occurrence of the hazardous event, and judged the 2005 IEC graph "better balanced ... due to more levels of severity available"; both are the authors' assessments of those editions. Their conclusion keeps both halves: "While the two standards offer the user a similar outcome in terms of a declared range of reliability, the two methods differ significantly in terms of the details of the methods." The differences they list are the parameters for estimating PL and SIL, the safety requirement obtained, the distribution of PL and SIL, common cause failures, and diagnostic coverage.

CAPIEL's 2024 paper notes the practical result: the existence of the two standards "can cause confusion amongst users – especially when certain machinery standards (C-type standards) offer the possibility to use either of the standards." As engineering reasoning, a heavy-handling project names one standard for each safety function in its specification, and does not derive a requirement with one method and verify it with the other (Chinniah et al., 2019, abstract, §4.2, §4.3 and §5; CAPIEL, 2024, §1).

How do PL and SIL correspond, and why is the table not a conversion?​

ISO 13849-1:2023 Table 4 correlates PL with SIL for high/continuous operating mode: PL a has no correlation, PL b and PL c correspond to SIL 1, PL d to SIL 2, and PL e to SIL 3. IEC 62061 Table 4 relates average frequency of dangerous failure (PFH), SIL and PL for pre-designed subsystems: below 10⁻⁵ per hour for SIL 1 (PL b or c), below 10⁻⁶ for SIL 2 (PL d), and below 10⁻⁷ for SIL 3 (PL e), with a footnote that PL b does not correspond to SIL 1 for a Category B structure. CAPIEL's prose confirms where the correspondence lives: Table A.6 in IEC 62061 "now also shows the corresponding PL's", and "In a similar way Table 4 in EN ISO 13849-1 shows the correspondence between PL and SIL."

The public sources cited here frame it as a correspondence, not a conversion. Safebook 5's own approximate table, written to the earlier editions, carries the warning that it "is for general guidance and must NOT be used for conversion purposes. The full requirements of the standards must be referenced." Chinniah and co-authors explain why the scales do not map one to one: the five PLs "were originally conceived to correspond to the five original architectures in EN 954-1:1996 and ISO 13849-1:1999", and "No correspondence with the IEC 61508 model was considered when the EN/ISO standards were being developed."

As engineering reasoning, the failure mode is a subsystem counted at a level its architecture does not reach; the footnote's own case is a Category B structure at PL b treated as if it were SIL 1. It arises when a vendor data sheet rates a device in one system and the function is designed to the other (ISO 13849-1:2023, Table 4; IEC 62061:2021+AMD1:2024+AMD2:2026, Table 4; CAPIEL, 2024, §3.4; Rockwell Automation SAFEBK-RM002C-EN-P, p. 65; Chinniah et al., 2019, §2).

What do categories, MTTFD, DC and CCF mean in ISO 13849-1:2023?​

ISO 13849-1 builds its PL from several properties of each subsystem. CAPIEL's summary of the 2023 design flow lists them with their clauses: category (6.1.3), mean time to dangerous failure, MTTFD (6.1.4), diagnostic coverage, DC (6.1.5), common cause failure, CCF (6.1.6), and systematic failures (6.1.7).

The IFA's summary of the 2023 edition gives the main changes with values:

  • Category 2 now centers on fault detection in the functional channel, for each of its parts (input, logic, output), "at least with 'low' diagnostic coverage (DC), i.e. 60% fault detection." The test rate "must be at least 100 times higher than the demand rate, or testing occurs immediately upon demand of the safety function and prevents the hazard", and the MTTFD of the test channel "must be greater than half the MTTFD of the entire functional channel."
  • Category 4 requires "only" a high DC of 99% for the PFH calculation; undetected failures "with a very low probability" need not be factored into fault accumulation, "provided that this fault consideration is documented and verified."
  • MTTFD may now be estimated from reliable field data for identical components in similar applications, where no manufacturer's data exist and the Annex C methods do not apply.
  • CCF and systematic failures have their own subsections, and the standard expressly requires a functional safety plan against systematic failures.
  • Logic without reliability data: the alternative procedure (6.1.9) applies to subsystems containing mechanical, (electro-)hydraulic and (electro-)pneumatic components for which no reliability data are available, and now only where the good engineering practice method of Annex C.2 cannot be used; for the logic part, Category B, 2, and 3 subsystems may use an estimated MTTFD of ten years per channel, Category 1 thirty years; the method is not permitted in Category 4, and "The achievable maximum is PL c."

The IFA also reports that fault exclusion, now in 6.1.10, carries a restriction previously known only from the withdrawn ISO/TR 23849: "A PL e for subsystems must not be based on fault exclusions alone." ISO 13849-1:2023 6.1.10 states that a PL e subsystem cannot rely on fault exclusions alone (Hauke et al., 2023, §6; CAPIEL, 2024, §2.1; ISO 13849-1:2023, 6.1.3 and 6.1.10).

What changed in IEC 62061, and what does "maximum SIL" mean?​

IEC lists the significant technical changes of the 2021 edition against the 2005 edition and its two amendments, including:

  • the structure updated "to reflect the design process of the safety function";
  • "standard extended to non-electrical technologies";
  • definitions aligned with IEC 61508-4, and a functional safety plan introduced (Clause 4);
  • a reference to security requirements (6.8) and requirements on periodic testing (6.9);
  • "shift from 'SILCL' to 'maximum SIL' of a subsystem (Clause 7)";
  • software use cases (Clause 8), and independence for software verification (Clause 8) and validation (Clause 9).

The wording matters when reading older documents. Safebook 5 (2016) still describes the subsystem limit as the "SIL Claim Limit (SIL CL)", and Pilz's change list writes '"SIL CL" renamed "SIL"'; IEC's own phrase is "maximum SIL" of a subsystem. Clause 7 sets how the maximum SIL of a subsystem is determined.

CAPIEL's summary of Edition 2.0 adds software limits: three levels of application software are defined; on a safe platform, "FVL is limited to SIL 2, while LVL can be used up to SIL 3", and level 3 is application software developed to IEC 61508 (up to SIL 3). The IFA defines FVL and LVL as full-variability and limited-variability languages. Pilz's status table records IEC 62061:2021/AMD1:2024 as published in March 2024 and AMD2:2026 in March 2026; the IEC page for the consolidated Edition 2.2 does not list what each amendment changed (IEC 62061:2021+AMD1:2024+AMD2:2026; Rockwell Automation SAFEBK-RM002C-EN-P, p. 65; Pilz, 2026; CAPIEL, 2024, §2.2; Hauke et al., 2023, §7).

Can a subsystem rated under one standard be used in a safety function designed to the other?​

The 2023 edition of ISO 13849-1 and the 2021 edition of IEC 62061 both allow it, with conditions. Pilz lists, among changes affecting both standards, "Allow subsystems that were developed in accordance with one standard to be used in the other." The IFA describes the ISO side: the 2023 edition "only deals with the integration of those intended for use under high demand or continuous mode of operation" and designed according to Route 1H of IEC 61508-2, and an SRP/CS "may also include subsystems of different categories and subsystems with SIL classifications." When subsystems are combined, the IFA says the preferred method of adding PFH values is now separated more distinctly from the table-based method for subsystems without PFH. ISO 13849-1:2023 6.2 holds those combination rules.

CAPIEL describes the IEC side: IEC 62061 allows pre-designed subsystems to ISO 13849-1 or IEC 61508, with the restriction that "subsystems using complex components designed according to EN ISO 13849-1 can only be used if they also meet the requirements of IEC 61508 or an applicable functional safety product standard."

Dual-rated components show the overlap in practice. A 2020 Siemens drive safety manual states that the drive system's safety functions meet Category 3 and PL d to ISO 13849-1, and SIL 2 to IEC 61508 and EN 61800-5-2. As engineering reasoning, a heavy-handling designer using a drive's safe torque-off or safe speed function in a PL-rated function still checks that the drive's rating, demand mode, and PFH match the way the function uses it (Pilz, 2026; Hauke et al., 2023, §6 and §6.8; ISO 13849-1:2023, 6.2; CAPIEL, 2024, §4.8; Siemens 6SL3097-5AR00-0BP3, §9.2 p. 353).

How do the current editions specify and validate a safety function?​

Both editions now start from a written safety requirements specification (SRS). CAPIEL writes that the SRS requirements "are now described in an equal manner in both editions." The IFA says that in ISO 13849-1:2023 the SRS records each safety function's triggering event, required reaction, PLr, permitted response time, operating modes, behavior on energy loss, demand rate, and restart conditions, and that the SRS review comes before the SRP/CS design phase, "so that any specification errors can be rectified at an early stage." Two new subsections address defeat and remote access: 5.2.3 "requires designers to minimise any motivation to defeat safety functions", and 5.2.4 specifies that, by default, remote access must be limited "in such a way that no dangerous situations can arise through the unnoticed presence of persons within the hazard zone of the machinery." ISO 13849-1:2023 clause 5 holds these SRS requirements.

Validation moved. The IFA says the new section 10 "has been taken over entirely from sections 4 to 12 of EN ISO 13849-2" and that "Except for some restructuring, the content and the requirements have essentially remained unchanged", and that "irrespective of the category, at least a functional test of the safety functions is required in addition to the analysis." It reports that a revision of Part 2 will be limited to its tables and validation examples, after which there are plans to migrate all of Part 2 into Part 1. On the IEC side, the 2021 edition added requirements on independence for software verification and for validation activities (Clause 9).

As engineering reasoning, the validation plan for a heavy machine is written from the SRS before factory acceptance testing, and each function is tested with the loads, speeds, and modes the SRS names (Hauke et al., 2023, §5 and §8; CAPIEL, 2024, §3.7; IEC 62061:2021+AMD1:2024+AMD2:2026; ISO 13849-1:2023, clause 5 and clause 10).

How does OSHA treat PL and SIL ratings in the US?​

OSHA has not incorporated either standard. Its incorporation-by-reference list, 29 CFR 1910.6, names IEC documents in paragraph (q) and ISO documents in paragraph (v), and neither ISO 13849-1 nor IEC 62061 is among them. OSHA's 2019 request for information on lockout/tagout says the standard "currently requires that all sources of energy, including energy stored in the machine itself, be controlled during servicing and maintenance of machines and equipment using an energy-isolating device (EID)", and "Control circuit type devices are specifically excluded from OSHA's definition of an EID." It notes that "technological advances since the standard was issued in 1989 suggest that, at least in some circumstances, control circuit type devices may be at least as safe as EIDs", and that OSHA "is also evaluating criteria used by consensus standards to determine the safety effectiveness of control circuits."

After a variance request, OSHA "determined that there may be a basis for amending the Lockout/Tagout standard to allow the use of control circuit type devices for hazardous energy control under certain conditions." It said it believes their use "is typically limited to the types of tasks that do not meet the minor servicing exception" but also "do not require either extensive disassembly of the machine or worker entrance into hazardous areas that may be difficult to escape quickly", giving machine setup as an example. An RFI is not a rule and creates no requirement; the requirement remains 29 CFR 1910.147.

OSHA's 2008 interpretation states that "Circuit control systems, such as the PLC system you describe, are not energy isolating devices as defined at §1910.147(b)." The machine guarding and maintenance access article covers the narrow minor-servicing case in that letter. As engineering reasoning, a PL d or SIL 2 rating describes how reliably a safety function performs; it does not turn the function into an energy isolating device for servicing (OSHA 29 CFR 1910.6; OSHA, Federal Register 84 FR 22756, 2019, pp. 22756–22758; OSHA Standard Interpretation, January 25, 2008; OSHA 29 CFR 1910.147-1989).

What controls and sensing hardware carries a rated safety function on a handling machine?​

A rated safety function is a chain of hardware. Chinniah and co-authors decompose a safety-related control circuit into "three basic building blocks: input, logic and output": for an interlocking guard, the input is the interlock switch, the logic is the safety relay that monitors it, and the output is the contactor controlling power to the motor. The IFA describes the same chain in ISO 13849-1:2023 terms, from the input (sensors) through the logic (processing) to the output (power control elements), each a subsystem carrying a safety sub-function. A note in the ISO 14119:2024 abstract says "The processing of the signal from the interlocking device to stop the machine and prevent unexpected start up is covered in ISO 14118, ISO 13849-1 and IEC 62061."

Electromagnetic immunity is one place the standards diverge. CAPIEL says IEC 62061 requires application of IEC 61000-1-2, while ISO 13849-1 "describes four recommended routes in the informative Annex L." The IFA's 2023 summary describes one route: up to PL d (and PL e if Category 4 requirements are met), immunity can be shown by system-level measures scored from Table L.1, met at a total of at least 280 points for two-channel systems (Categories 2, 3, and 4) or 230 for single-channel systems (Categories B and 1). The 2021 edition of IEC 62061 added requirements on periodic testing (6.9).

As engineering reasoning, on heavy handling equipment the inputs are gate interlocks on a transfer-car travel zone, a light curtain at a positioner's load station, or an encoder feeding a manual-mode safe-speed function; the outputs are drive safe torque-off, brakes, and monitored hydraulic load-holding valves. Logged diagnostics, test results, and demand counts show whether the SRS's assumed test and demand rates hold in service. UTEC Industrial, a Rockwell Automation Recognized System Integrator, integrates Allen-Bradley ControlLogix and CompactLogix control with VFD and servo drives and builds UL 508A control panels for the handling systems it builds (Chinniah et al., 2019, §2; Hauke et al., 2023, §5 and §16; ISO 14119:2024; CAPIEL, 2024, §4; IEC 62061:2021+AMD1:2024+AMD2:2026).

Which standard should a buyer specify, and where does the choice sit in the build chain?​

No public source cited here prescribes one standard over the other; three facts drive the choice:

  • Complex electronics. CAPIEL says that "For complex electronics EN IEC 62061 refers directly to IEC 61508 or an applicable functional safety product standard, whereas EN ISO 13849-1 does not provide this requirement." IEC's own abstract puts the design of complex programmable electronic subsystems outside IEC 62061's scope.
  • Machine-specific standards. Where a type-C standard specifies the PLr or the method, it governs; the IFA notes that Annex A applies "unless it is specified in a product standard (type-C standard)".
  • No merged standard. Pilz describes "the failed attempt to unify the two standards within IEC ISO 17305"; Chinniah and co-authors reported in 2019 that merged-standard work "has been put on hold by ISO TC199 and Joint Working Group 1 was disbanded in 2018", while work continued in ISO TC199/WG1 and IEC TC44 to reduce the areas of conflict, with a view to eventually merging the two standards. CAPIEL "believes that a merged standard is now feasible", which is CAPIEL's position, not a standards-body plan. The joint guidance ISO/TR 23849 was withdrawn; the IFA dates the withdrawal to 2020 and says its content is now in both standards.

As engineering reasoning, the choice runs along the chain: design and engineering set each function's PLr or SIL and fix the standard and architecture; machining, fabrication, and assembly build the brakes, stops, and load-holding manifolds the functions rely on; weld fatigue and stress relief decide structural failures no safety function can catch; drives, controls, and tuning deliver the stopping performance the SRS assumes; and monitoring confirms it in service. UTEC Industrial performs factory acceptance testing and on-site commissioning, where each safety function can be validated against its SRS before handover (CAPIEL, 2024, §4 and §5; IEC 62061:2021+AMD1:2024+AMD2:2026; Hauke et al., 2023, §1; Pilz, 2026; Chinniah et al., 2019, §5).

Related Articles

References​

  • ISO 13849-1:2023: Safety of machinery — Safety-related parts of control systems — Part 1: General principles for design. International Organization for Standardization, 2023.
  • IEC 62061:2021+AMD1:2024+AMD2:2026: Safety of machinery — Functional safety of safety-related control systems. IEC, 2026 (Ed. 2.2, consolidated version).
  • ISO 14119:2024: Safety of machinery — Interlocking devices associated with guards — Principles for design and selection. International Organization for Standardization, 2024.
  • OSHA. "The Control of Hazardous Energy (Lockout/Tagout); Request for Information." Federal Register, 84(97), 22756–22762, May 20, 2019.
  • OSHA Standard Interpretation: Use of a PLC system as an alternative measure which provides effective protection for minor servicing activities. Occupational Safety and Health Administration, 2008.
  • OSHA 29 CFR 1910.147-1989: The Control of Hazardous Energy (Lockout/Tagout). Occupational Safety and Health Administration, 1989.
  • OSHA 29 CFR 1910.6: Incorporation by Reference. U.S. Department of Labor, as amended through 2026.
  • Hauke, M., Bömer, T., Büllesbach, K.-H. Fourth edition of EN ISO 13849-1: Most important new features in 2023 at a glance. German Social Accident Insurance (DGUV), 2023.
  • CAPIEL. Overview and comparison between EN ISO 13849-1 and EN IEC 62061, White Paper, Edition 1. CAPIEL, 2024.
  • Chinniah, Y., Nix, D. S. G., Jocelyn, S., Burlet-Vienney, D., Bourbonnière, R., Karimi, B., Ben Mosbah, A. (2019). "Safety of Machinery: Significant Differences in Two Widely Used International Standards for the Design of Safety-Related Control Systems." Safety, 5(4), 76.
  • Pilz. Functional safety standards. Pilz, 2026 (undated web documentation, accessed October 2026).
  • Rockwell Automation SAFEBK-RM002C-EN-P: Machinery Safebook 5: Safety related control systems for machinery — Principles, standards and implementation. Rockwell Automation, 2016.
  • Siemens 6SL3097-5AR00-0BP3: SINAMICS S120 Safety Integrated Function Manual, Edition 06/2020. Siemens AG, 2020.

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